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ABSTRACT
I present and solve the problem of  a  producer who faces costs of acquiring, absorbing, and
processing information. I establish a series of theoretical results describing the producer's behavior.
First, I find the conditions under which she prefers to set a plan for the price she charges, or instead
prefers to set a plan for the quantity she sells. Second, I show that the agent rationally chooses to be
inattentive to news, only sporadically updating her information. I solve for the optimal length of
inattentiveness and characterize its determinants. Third, I explicitly aggregate the behavior of many
such producers. I apply these results to a model of inflation. I find that the model can fit the
quantitative facts on post-war inflation remarkably well, that it is a good forecaster of future









A long-standing question in macroeconomics is why don’t prices adjust every instant to
reﬂect the incoming stream of news on the environment facing ﬁrms? This question is impor-
tant because its answer determines the answer to many other questions in macroeconomics.
For instance, the imperfect adjustment of prices to news on money lies behind the eﬀects of
monetary policy on real activity. To give another example, if we can understand the dynamic
r e s p o n s eo fp r i c e st os h o c k s ,w es h o u l db ea b l et oe x p l a i nt h ed y n a m i c so fi n ﬂation, one of
the key aggregate variables that macroeconomists purport to explain.
At least since John Maynard Keynes, a popular answer has been to assume that prices
are ﬁxed for periods of time. Barro (1972), Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1982), Rotemberg
(1982) and Mankiw (1985) provided a micro-foundation for sticky prices by assuming that
there is a ﬁxed physical cost that ﬁrms must pay whenever they change their price. Caballero
and Engel (1991) and Caplin and Leahy (1997) aggregated this infrequent adjustment across
many diﬀerent ﬁrms. Dotsey, King and Woman (1999), Danziger (1999) and Golosov and
Lucas (2003) studied the eﬀects of monetary policy in these economies. A closely related
model of sticky prices by-passes the micro-foundations and assumes from the start that prices
adjust only at some random dates picked from a speciﬁc distribution that allows for simple
aggregation (Calvo, 1983, Woodford, 2003a).
The model of sticky prices has always been criticized but over the past decade the criticism
has intensiﬁed. Researchers have noted that there is little support in the data for the model’s
basic assumption. With the exception of magazine prices and restaurant menus, for most
products it is diﬃcult to identify any signiﬁcant ﬁxed physical costs of changing prices.
Research has also found that the data does not support the model’s key micro prediction.
Bils and Klenow (2004) noted that individual prices change very frequently in the United
States. Finally, many authors (e.g. Mankiw, 2001) have shown that the macroeconomic
predictions of the sticky price model for the relation between inﬂation, real activity and
monetary policy are counterfactual.
An alternative explanation for the imperfect adjustment of prices to news acknowledges
that people have limited information and a limited ability to perform computations. These
models start by emphasizing that in the standard classical model, agents are aware of all
the information every instant and are constantly using it to compute their optimal actions.
Yet there is an enormous amount of information in the world and most of it comes with
a cost, in money or time, both in acquiring the information but especially in interpreting
it. The limited-information approach argues that following the hallmark of economics of
studying choice subject to constraints, information should be treated as a costly good. The
Lucas (1972) islands model showed that if price-setters have imperfect information, they will
adjust incompletely to news, which generates nominal rigidities and real eﬀects of monetary
policy. More recently, Mankiw and Reis (2002) provided a limited information alternative to
the sticky price Calvo (1983) model by assuming that agents update their information sets
and price plans at randomly chosen dates. They showed that this model of sticky information
is able to match some facts on inﬂation and output dynamics and to generate reasonable
responses of these variables to monetary policy shocks.
Currently though, models of pricing based on limited information lack a micro-foundation
based on optimizing behavior, lack an explicit aggregation across many agents, and lack an
2explicit contrast of their predictions with the data on inﬂation. This is what this paper
proposes to do. I will use the inattentiveness model of limited information to model the
behavior of producers. This model adds to a standard proﬁt-maximization problem, one
new constraint: that agents must pay a cost to acquire, absorb, and process information in
forming expectations and making decisions. The basic implication of this assumption is that
agents rationally choose to be inattentive, only sporadically updating their information sets
and plans at optimally chosen dates.
The model makes several interesting novel predictions. First, it provides a micro-foundation
for time-contingent adjustment, since people update their plans at certain dates regardless
of the state of the economy at these dates. Time-contingent adjustment is appealing relative
to its state-contingent alternative because it typically implies larger and longer real eﬀects
of monetary policy and it can reproduce the delayed and hump-shaped response of inﬂation
to shocks. Second, I derive the conditions under which producers choose to write plans for
the price they will charge or for the quantity they will produce. These conditions are easy
to verify empirically and they provide a rich set of theoretical predictions that can be used
both to test the model as well as to build future models of inﬂa t i o ni nw h i c hi n d u s t r i e s
diﬀer over their type of plan. Third, I derive an approximate solution for the producer’s
decision of how long to be inattentive for. One virtue of this solution is that it shows how
industry characteristics aﬀect the frequency of planning. Fourth, I explicitly aggregate the
behavior of many inattentive producers. One surprising result emerges: under some general
conditions, the distribution of inattentiveness is exponential. Fifth, under some particular
assumptions, these theoretical results turn out to provide a micro-foundation to the assump-
tions made by Mankiw and Reis (2002), thus putting in ﬁrm ground this particular model of
nominal rigidities due to incomplete information. Finally and sixth, this paper exploits these
micro-foundations to construct a simple model of inﬂation and show that it performs well in
ﬁtting the data in three aspects: the model can quantitatively match the second moments
of the post-war data very closely, it beats reduced-form autoregressive models at forecasting
inﬂation, and it is robust to the Lucas critique in that it can account moderately well for
the inﬂation data under a diﬀerent policy regime in the pre-war United States.
There are a few papers that are more closely related to this one. Caballero’s (1989)
derivation of time-dependent rules from ﬁrst principles is a precursor to some of the cal-
culations in this paper. He considers a more restricted choice of planning dates though,
and focuses on a diﬀerent set of issues. Bonomo and Carvalho (2003) provide a model of
optimal time-contingent price adjustment, but one in which prices must be ﬁxed in between
adjustments rather than following possibly time-varying plans, as in the model in this paper.
Burstein (2005) presents a sticky plan model in which prices also follow pre-determined plans
that are only sporadically updated. The price-setters in his model have full information each
instant and use it to decide whether to adjust their plan. They choose to respond diﬀerently
to large and small shocks, and to positive and negative desired price changes. In the model
in this paper instead, consistent with the underlying assumption that information is costly,
not just price plans but also information sets are updated sporadically. Because they are not
aware of the news as it arrives, price-setters do not respond asymmetrically to it.
Finally, Woodford (2003b) and Moscarini (2004) model inattentiveness by price-setters
using an alternative approach suggested by Sims (2003). Using tools from electrical engi-
neering, this approach models agents who have a limited capacity to absorb information. In
3Moscarini’s (2004) version, agents also choose to only infrequently update their information,
and when they do, they only obtain an imperfect signal on the state of the world. In the
inattentiveness model instead, when producers update their plans, they become aware of
everything that is relevant. While this feature of the inattentiveness model is extreme, it
has the payoﬀ of making the model signiﬁcantly more tractable. For instance, the theoreti-
cal results in this paper already lead to fully speciﬁed models of inﬂation, whereas theories
of limited information capacity still face some diﬃcult (but exciting) conceptual hurdles.
Awaiting progress in those theories, this paper’s development of the inattentiveness model
should make possible future comparisons of the two approaches.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the problem facing producers. Section
3a n s w e r saﬁrst question: will the inattentive agent set a plan for prices or for quantities?
Section 4 solves the problem of how often to adjust and examines the determinants of inat-
tentiveness. Section 5 aggregates the behavior of many inattentive agents. Section 6 uses
these results to set up a model of inﬂation. Sections 7 contrasts the model with data, and
section 8 concludes.
2. THE INATTENTIVE PRODUCER’S PROBLEM
2.1. An informal description of the problem
Consider the problem facing a monopolist that produces a perishable good. Both the
production technology and the demand for its good are uncertain and can change every
instant, so that to obtain the full information ﬁrst-best proﬁts, the producer would have to
observe the determinants of costs and demand every instant. The assumption in this paper is
that this entails a cost, namely that it is costly to acquire, absorb, and process information.
It is costly to acquire information in the sense of collecting all the pieces of information that
are relevant to assess the current state of the world. It is costly to absorb information in
the sense of compiling this information into the relevant suﬃcient statistics needed to make
optimal decisions. And it is costly to process information in the sense of coming up with the
optimal action and implementing it.
For a typical producer, these costs stand, for instance, for the costs of keeping detailed
accounts of sales, the costs of monitoring and assessing the diﬀerent stages of production, and
the payments to outside consultants for their advice. Radner (1992) insightfully observed
that a large fraction of the workforce is employed in managerial occupations, which are
essentially about processing information and making decisions. Even if only a small fraction
of these people’s time is spent at acquiring, absorbing, and processing information towards
making optimal decisions, the costs of doing so can be substantial. Zbaracki et al. (2004)
directly measured the costs incurred by a large U.S. manufacturing ﬁrm associated with
setting its price catalog. These were as high as 1.2% of the company’s revenue and 20% of
its net margin.
Facing these costs, the producer optimally chooses to only update her information spo-
radically, and to be inattentive to new information in between adjustment dates. When she
does obtain information, conditional on it she decides: whether to set prices or quantities;
which price to charge or which quantity to sell for the duration of the plan; and when next
to plan.
4To illustrate these three simultaneous decisions, consider the example of a ﬁctional baker.
Her ﬁrst decision is on which variable to write a plan on: price or quantity. If she sets a price
for her bread, she will keep the oven burning and bread coming out as long as customers
are walking through the door. If instead she chooses to produce a certain amount of bread,
she then gives it to a seller. This seller takes the bread to the market and distributes it
among homes and shops, charging whatever positive price is necessary to sell all the bread
today, since by the end of the day the bread becomes stale and worthless. Finally, the seller
returns the sales proceeds to the baker. Facing this choice of prices versus quantities, the
baker forms an expectation of her proﬁts under the two alternatives and chooses the most
proﬁtable one.
In both cases, an important assumption that I maintain is market clearing. In the
case of a price plan, this implies that some mechanism in the economy directs consumers
to the baker’s shop as long as their marginal utility of bread is above the posted price.
In the case of a quantity plan, there is some mechanism in the economy that acts as a
seller ﬁnding the price that clears the market. These mechanisms serve the purpose of
the ﬁctional Walrasian auctioneer that economists routinely assume to ensure that markets
clear in equilibrium. I maintain this assumption because an operational non-market-clearing
deﬁnition of equilibrium is still an elusive research objective, despite the initial steps of Barro
and Grossman (1971).
The second decision for the baker is on the content of the plan. If she chooses a price plan,
this consists of the path of prices to charge until the next planning date. If she chooses a
quantity plan, it is the path for the amount of bread to produce. In both cases, note that the
producer chooses paths, not numbers, since she knows the calendar date and so her conduct
can depend on it. Recent empirical research on the dynamics of individual prices supports
this path-setting. Many prices are revised at infrequent intervals, but in between revisions
have large pre-determined swings that coincide with predictable events, such as holidays, the
Christmas shopping period, or weeks of “specials” (Chevalier et al 2003, Rotemberg, 2005).
The ﬁnal decision at a planning date is on the horizon of the plan, or on when to obtain
new information and plan again. The baker realizes that while on the one hand, extending
the horizon of the plan saves on the costs of planning, on the other hand, it implies that
decisions towards the end of the plan are made with severely outdated information and so are
likely to be missing on substantial proﬁts. Suﬃciently far in the future, the cost of following
an outdated plan becomes too high relative to the cost of obtaining information, and it is
optimal to stop and plan again.
Readers might wonder whether there isn’t some information that the producer can obtain
for free. For instance, why can’t the baker observe the quantity she sold at the end of
the day at her ﬁxed price, or hear from the seller at which price did she sell the bread?
The answer is that, in principle, she can. But then, the baker must use this one piece of
information to infer the current state of demand, and proceed to collect a myriad of other
pieces of information that aﬀect demand in the future, from consumers’ taste for bread to
their disposable income. Moreover, the baker must go through her entire production process
and realize how much exactly did she pay for each input and how long it took to combine
them to make bread, as well as forecast how all of these are expected to change by tomorrow.
Even if some of the information is costless to acquire, it is still costly to absorb and process
this information to change the optimal plan. The basic assumption in this paper is not
5inconsistent with people being aware of some events, as long as it is still costly to think
through this information.1 Moreover, as I will show later, even tiny costs of information can
generate substantial inattentiveness.
2.2. The formal problem
The monopolist produces a single perishable good with a stochastic technology repre-
sented by a continuous and smooth cost function C(Y,s):RS+1 → R. The quantity pro-
duced is denoted by Y and s is a vector stochastic process with S components standing for
the diﬀerent relevant bits of information. The demand for this product is also stochastic and
is represented by the continuous and smooth function Q(P,s):RS+1 → R,w h e r eP stands
for the price charged. I assume that demand is always positive and falls with the price being
charged.
The stochastic process st is deﬁn e do nas t a n d a r dﬁltered probability space with ﬁltration
F = {Ft,t≥ 0}. I assume that st has the Markov property and, without loss of generality,
that it is arranged so that it is ﬁrst-order Markov. The state at a given date t + τ is then
a function of st and a set of innovations uτ =( ut,u t+τ],s ot h a tIc a nw r i t est+τ = Ψ(st,uτ)
to denote the transition between the state at date t and the state at date t + τ,w h i c hi s
assumed to be diﬀerentiable.
The planning dates are denoted by the almost surely non-decreasing function D(i):
N0 → R with D(0) = 0. The periods of inattentiveness are deﬁned as d(i)=D(i)−D(i−1).
The optimal choice of planning dates deﬁnes a new ﬁltration = = {=t,t ≥ 0} such that
=t = FD(i) for t ∈ [D(i),D(i+1)). The restriction imposed by a plan is that the producer’s
choices at time t must be measurable with respect to =. That is, her choices for time t
must be conditional on the information she has at time t, which coincides with the available
information in the economy at her last planning date.
The producer maximizes expected proﬁts conditional on her information. If at time t she
sets a price, she obtains proﬁts:2
Π
P(sD(i),t− D(i)) = max
Pt
E [PtQ(Pt,st) − C(Q(Pt,st),st) |= t]. (1)
The solution is a function of the state at the last planning date sD(i) and of the time since the
last planning. Given the Markov assumption, these are suﬃcient statistics. If the producer
chooses a quantity to sell, she obtains
Π





−1(Yt,st)Yt − C(Yt,st) |= t
¤
, (2)
where Q−1(P,s):RS+1 → R is the inverse demand function. Since the producer can choose
1An alternative assumption is that the producer can costlessly acquire a few pieces of information every
instant, costlessly absorb these into a suﬃcient statistic, and costlessly use these to evaluate an optimal
plan. Still, as long as there is some other independent information that can only be acquired, absorbed, and
processed at a cost, the model in this paper is still applicable. The inattentiveness is now only with respect
to the costly pieces of information.
2I will denote the expectation conditional on the information at the current planning date by E[.].
6either a price to charge or a quantity to produce, her proﬁts are







The third possibility allows the ﬁrm to shut down if proﬁts are negative.
I make the following assumption on this problem:
Assumption 1. The functions C(.,.) and Q(.,.) are such that:
i) The maximization problems leading to ΠP(s,t) and ΠY(s,t) are well deﬁned for all s
and t; namely, the problems have a solution and expectations can be formed.
ii) ΠP(s,t) and ΠY(s,t) are ﬁnite for all possible s.
iii) Π(s,t) is continuous in both arguments.
Whenever the agent updates her information and plans, she incurs a non-negative ﬁnite
cost given by the continuous function K(st):RS → R. Producers maximize the expected












by choosing a sequence of planning dates D = {D(i)}∞
i=1 that is =−measurable. Note that if
the costs of planning are always zero, the producer optimally chooses to be always attentive.
This problem has a recursive structure between adjustment dates. Letting s denote the
state at the current planning date and sd the state at the next planning date, I can write
the problem as










Because I passed the expectations operator through d, I have imposed the constraint that the
date of the next plan must be conditional on the information at the current planning date.
Note that one can see the producer as choosing her next planning date either at the current
planning date or instead at that future date. Since she receives no new information while
inattentive, her choice will be the same regardless of when it is made. Bellman’s principle of
optimality then implies that:3
Proposition 1. The dynamic program in (4) has the same solution as maximizing (3):
V (s)=s u p
D
J(s,D).
There is a well-deﬁned, continuous, ﬁnite, and unique value function solving this problem,
a n das e to fn e c e s s a r yﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the solution.
The problem in (4) may strike some readers as similar to optimal stopping problems
and their associated regulated Brownian motions. However, in those problems, the producer
3The appendix contains the proof of this and all the other propositions.
7observes the state of the economy every instant and decides whether to adjust or not. Adjust-
ment is then state-contingent. In the inattentiveness model instead, in between adjustments
the producer is getting no new information. Whereas regulated Brownian motion problems
lead to adjustments contingent on the current state of the economy, inattentive agents adjust
at optimally chosen dates regardless of the state of the economy at those dates. The optimal
planning intervals are not necessarily always the same though since they depend recursively
on the state of the economy at the last adjustment date. Adjustment with inattentiveness
is therefore recursively time-contingent, independent of the current state, but a function of
the state at the last adjustment.
This diﬀerence between state-contingent and recursively time-contingent adjustment leads
to very diﬀerent dynamics and predictions. For instance, in the inattentiveness model, to-
d a y ’ sn e w sd on o ta ﬀect the fraction of producers adjusting today. In state-contingent models
instead, a large shock to for instance monetary policy leads many producers to adjust im-
mediately, which oﬀsets the real eﬀects of such a shock. Another example of the diﬀerence
between the two models is that in the inattentiveness model, those who adjust may or may
not have been charging a price that was far away from the optimum. The inattentive pro-
ducers expect to be far away from target, but they may or not be, depending on the actual
current and past news. In state-contingent models, those who adjust are those whose current
prices are far away from the optimum. As Danziger (1999) and more recently Golosov and
Lucas (2003) emphasize, this feature of state-contingent models again attenuates the real
impact of monetary policy shocks.
3. WHAT TO PLAN
The producer must ﬁrst choose whether to set a plan for prices or a plan for quantities.4
An immediate result is:
Proposition 2. If demand is certain, the producer is indiﬀerent between price and
quantity plans.
The proof is straightforward: if the demand function is ﬁxed, then setting a price ﬁxes a
quantity, and setting a quantity ﬁxes a price. The producer can choose a price-quantity pair
in the stable demand function. Being inattentive may be costly, but it is equally so for price
and quantity plans.
Shocks to demand break this equivalence between price and quantity plans, since setting
one leaves the other to vary with the shocks to ensure market-clearing. With both types of
shocks and denoting by Qx the partial derivative of the demand function with respect to x
evaluated at s = E [s]:
Proposition 3. Up to a second order approximation in the size of the shocks ksk,
4Weitzman (1974) asked whether a central planner should ﬁx ex ante the demand for a product in terms
of price or quantity, knowing the ﬁrm will respond to shocks. The problem in this paper is the exact opposite.
It is the ﬁrm that is committing ex ante and demand that is moving with shocks.


















Producers prefer quantity plans otherwise, and are indiﬀerent in case of equality.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the case of a monopolist with a
zero marginal cost of production facing a linear demand curve with slope −1 subject to a
scalar multiplicative shock with an expected value of 1. The condition for price plans to be
preferred becomes: QsQps < 0. Graphically, in (Y,P) space, this implies that when it shifts
out, the demand curve becomes ﬂatter; when it shifts in, the demand curve becomes steeper.
This is depicted in ﬁgure 1. The optimal price is P∗ and the optimal quantity is Y ∗ where the
45 degree line intersects the demand curve. If a shock shifts demand out, with a price set at
P∗, the producer will now sell Y 0, which raises proﬁts by the area of the rectangle ABY 0Y ∗.
With a quantity plan, the producer will sell at price P0 and proﬁts increase by the area of
ACP 0P∗. Clearly, price plans raise proﬁts by more if AB > AC. But, since under condition
(5), this positive demand shock (Qs > 0) makes the demand curve ﬂatter (Qps < 0), it must
be that AB > AC. Conversely, a negative demand shock shifts the demand curve inwards
and makes it steeper. A price plan sells Y 00 units, while a quantity plan charges P00.S i n c e
demand is steeper, AD < AE, so price setting leads to smaller losses. Therefore, if (5) holds,
price plans lead to larger gains with positive shocks and smaller losses with negative shocks,
so the producer prefers them.
Now let the demand function have some curvature (Qpp 6=0 ). Figure 2 plots the case
of an outward shift in demand with zero marginal costs, but now in the case when Qps =0
so the slope is unchanged, so we can focus on the second term in (5). According to the
Proposition, the producer prefers price plans if Qpp < 0.F r o m t h e ﬁgure, clearly if the
demand function is linear then AB = AC, and the producer is indiﬀerent between the two
plans. Fixing the horizontal dislocation of the demand curve after the shock, and letting
the demand curve now be concave, under a quantity plan price increases only by AD.S i n c e
AB > AD,p r i c ep l a n sa r ep r e f e r r e d .T h ec a s eo fan e g a t i v es h o c k sw o r k sl i k e w i s e .
Table 1 evaluates Proposition 3 in the case of constant marginal costs c for a few com-
m o n l yu s e dd e m a n ds p e c i ﬁcations. Notably, with the iso-elastic demand function with mul-
tiplicative shocks that is often used in macroeconomics and international economics, price
plans are preferred (case (i)). With the logistic speciﬁcation commonly used in empirical
studies of market demand in microeconomics and industrial organization, as long as the
constant in the logistic regression is not too large so the ﬁrm does not capture a very large
amount of the market share, price plans are also preferred (case (ii)). These cases are fortu-
nate since casual observation seems to point towards price plans in the world. At least for the
common speciﬁcations of demand used by economists, the model predicts this should be the
case. More generally, if the demand function is subject to either additive or multiplicative
shocks, a suﬃcient condition for price plans to be preferred is that the demand function is











































Price or quantity plans for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of demand
Case Demand function Parameter restrictions Preferred plan
(i) Y = sP −θ θ>1 price
(ii) Y = 1
1+ebP−s b>0 price if E[s] ≤ 2+bc
quantity otherwise
(iii) Y = f(P)+sf p < 0 price if fpp ≤ 0
quantity otherwise
(iv) Y = sf(P) s>0,f >0,f p < 0 price
The third term in equation (5) involves the slope of marginal costs. The term CqqQ2
s
shows that that decreasing marginal costs (Cqq < 0) provides an extra incentive for price
plans. Intuitively, recall that the optimal quantity sold with full information is determined
by marginal costs equalling marginal revenue. If marginal costs are steeply increasing, then
shifts in marginal revenue have a small impact on the optimal quantity sold, so that a
quantity plan is close to optimal. If instead marginal costs are decreasing, shifts in demand
lead to a large discrepancy between the optimal quantity and the one set by a plan and this
explains why Cqq < 0 makes price plans preferred. Klemperer and Meyer (1986) emphasized
this eﬀect in their study of whether ﬁrms strategically interact as in the Bertrand model or as
in the Cournot model. The term 2CqsQs shows that if an outward shift of demand (Qs > 0)
lowers marginal costs (Cqs < 0) then price plans are preferred. Intuitively, following the
shock, a quantity plan leads to a higher price being charged, but since marginal costs are
lower, the producer should be charging a lower price. Following a quantity plan is therefore
more costly, so a price plan is preferred.
Proposition 3 applies only up to a second order approximation and, as with all approx-
imations, there is an error that may become large as shocks accumulate. In general, one
could use numerical methods to obtain more accurate solutions in some special cases. In a
few cases, analytical exact solutions exist, and it is worth solving one of these explicitly. It is
common to assume that demand is iso-elastic with multiplicative shocks, Q(εt,P t)=εtP
−θ
t ,
where ε is a non-negative i.i.d. demand shock and θ>1 is the elasticity of demand. I further
assume that the marginal cost of production, s, follows an independent geometric Brownian
motion with volatility σ>0 and that planning costs a ﬁxed share κ of proﬁts. The approx-
imate result from Table 1 is that, in this case, price plans are preferred. In this special case,
we can solve exactly for expected proﬁts, and ﬁnd that they are higher with a price plan if
E[ε]1/θ ≥ E[ε1/θ].T h i si st r u eb yJ e n s e n ’ si n e q u a l i t y ,c o n ﬁrming the approximate result.
Whether in the world we observe price or quantity plans, and whether the choice between
them accords with the predictions above, are interesting empirical questions. Using data on
which type of plan ﬁrms follow, the results in this section and in Klemperer and Meyer
(1986) provide a number of testable predictions.5
5The type of plan can either be inferred from time-series on prices and output of ﬁrms, or it can be
collected directly, as in Aiginger (1999), who asked a sample of managers of 930 Austrian manufacturing
businesses “What is you main strategic variable: do you decide to produce a speciﬁc quantity, thereafter
permitting demand to decide upon price conditions, or do you set the price, with competitors and the market
114. THE DETERMINANTS OF INATTENTIVENESS
4.1. The optimality conditions
Recall that optimal inattentiveness solves the Bellman equation (4). The necessary ﬁrst-
order condition for optimality is:
Π(s,d)=E
∙





On the left-hand side is the ﬂow value from not planning, which equals the proﬁts from
keeping to the old plan. On the right-hand side is the value from planning, which equals
the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term is the ﬂow value from planning, which is the diﬀerence
between the value of having a fresh plan and the cost of writing it. The second term is the
cost from postponing planning for another instant in which the cost and value of a new plan
may change.













Equations (4), (6) and (7) characterize the value function V (s) and optimal inattentiveness
d(s).
4.2. A general approximate solution
The dynamic program in (4) can be easily solved numerically. Analytically, in general,
the optimal inattentiveness is a complicated function of the state of the economy. However, a
simple approximate solution can be found by perturbing the problem around the point where
the costs of planning are zero. This approach requires only that V (s) and d(s) are locally
diﬀerentiable with respect to the costs of planning. Deﬁne the function G(s,t):RS+1 → R
as the expected diﬀerence between proﬁts earned with full information and proﬁts earned
while following a pre-chosen plan. Then:
Proposition 4. A perturbation approximation of the optimal inattentiveness around the







This solution shows that inattentiveness is determined by two factors. First, the larger
are the costs of planning, the longer is inattentiveness. Moreover, since d∗(.) is of order √
K, second order costs of planning lead to ﬁrst-order long inattentiveness. The reason
is that inattentive agents are near-rational in the Akerlof and Yellen (1985) sense. While
optimal inattentive behavior diﬀers from optimal behavior with full information, because
determining the quantity sold?” In response, 68% of managers professed to follow price plans, while 32%
admitted to quantity plans.
12the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sﬂat at a maximum, this deviation only has a second order eﬀect on
proﬁts (Mankiw, 1985). The agent is therefore willing to tolerate a ﬁrst-order period of
inattentiveness with only second order costs of planning since the inattentiveness involves a
loss in proﬁts that is also only second order.6
The second determinant of inattentiveness is Gt(.). The faster the losses from being
inattentive accumulate, the shorter is inattentiveness. This could be the case if demand
or production are very volatile so that larger forecast errors of the future are more likely.
Another reason for a large Gt is proﬁts that are very elastic with respect to price or quantity,
so that small errors due to inattentiveness lead to large foregone proﬁts.
4.3. The iso-elastic case
This case was introduced at the end of section 3. It assumes that demand is iso-elastic
with price-elasticity θ>1 and is subject to i.i.d. multiplicative shocks, while marginal costs
follow a geometric Brownian motion with variance σ2, and planning costs a ﬁxed share κ
of proﬁts. In this case the producer sets a plan for prices, charging Pt =( θ/(θ − 1))E [st].7
Then, the following result holds:













(1 − κr)=0 .
This solution is independent of the states of demand or production. If κ>1/r,i te q u a l s
inﬁnity. If κ<1/r,t h e nd∗ is unique and ﬁnite, and it increases with κ,d e c r e a s e sw i t hσ2,






This result illustrates the determinants of inattentiveness. First, inattentiveness is larger,
the larger are the costs of planning, and it is ﬁrst-order long with second-order planning costs.
Second, more volatile shocks lead to more frequent updating since inattentiveness is more
costly in a world that is rapidly changing.8 Third, a smaller price elasticity of demand
implies that the optimal price is less responsive to ﬂuctuations in marginal costs. The
inattentive price is therefore on average closer to the full information price. The loss from
being inattentive is therefore smaller and the agent stays inattentive for longer.
There is some evidence in favor of this last prediction. Bils and Klenow (2004) ﬁnd
that variables capturing the ﬂexibility of demand account for much of the variation in the
6In contrast, in state-contingent adjustment models of sticky prices, fourth-order adjustment costs induce
ﬁrst-order rigidities (Dixit, 1991). Since in these models the producer observes the current state of the
world, she perceives an option value of not adjusting since the state might change in the future making an
adjustment unnecessary.
7A curious property of the iso-elastic demand function is that the optimal price does not depend on the
state of demand. If there were no technology shocks, the producer could be inattentive forever.
8This prediction distinguishes the inattentiveness model from the limited information capacity model in
Moscarini (2004), in which higher volatility can lead to more infrequent adjustments. Future empirical work
can test these opposite predictions.
13frequency of price adjustment across goods. For instance, most goods sold in supermarkets
and grocery stores have very elastic demands since there is intense competition in these goods
from multiple stores and brands. These prices are among those that seem to change more
often in response to market conditions. In opposition, consider the ten most infrequently
revised prices in the United States according to Bils and Klenow (2004). Four of these are
fees set by the government, while another three are coin-operated machines and magazines,
for which there are clear high physical cost of changing prices. That the prices of these seven
goods are adjusted very infrequently is not mysterious. The other three are more interesting:
vehicle inspection, legal fees, and safe deposit box rentals. These are all goods for which
demand is likely not very sensitive to prices, thus supporting the prediction of the model.
Another piece of evidence in favor of this result comes from the European data on in-
dividual prices across sectors reported in Dhyne et al (2004). They ﬁnd that the prices of
services are the least frequently adjusted, whereas prices in the energy sector are very fre-
quently updated. Two features of the energy retail sector are that the cost of its raw inputs
are subject to frequent shocks (high σ2) and consumers are very sensitive to price changes
(high θ). Goods in the services sector on the other hand are typically diﬀerentiated, so that
their price elasticity of demand is low. The theoretical results in this section therefore seem
to be consistent with the broad patterns in the data. Systematically testing these predictions
empirically is an interesting topic for future research.
4.4. Real and nominal rigidities
It is common in macroeconomics to consider a world in which there are many identical
ﬁrms indexed by j, each a monopolist setting the price of a good facing a state of the
economy composed of the price level, P, the level of aggregate demand, Y ,a n ds h o c k st o
productivity, A. The proﬁt function then becomes π(p(j)−p,y,a), where small letters denote
the logarithms of the respective capital letters. The natural level of output, yn,i sd e ﬁned
as the output level if the costs of planning are zero so all the producers are attentive. The








−πppVa r[y − yn]
. (8)
An important determinant of optimal inattentiveness is α, which equals −πpy/πpp.B a l l
and Romer (1990) named this last parameter the inverse of an index of “real rigidities.”
The reason for this label is that a ﬁrst order log-linear approximation shows that a producer
wishes to set its price equal to p+α(y−yn). The parameter α therefore measures how much
the ﬁrm wishes to change its price in response to shocks. If α is small, not responding to
shocks is close to being optimal, so being inattentive involves a small cost and producers
are inattentive for longer, precisely as we see in equation (8). Longer inattentiveness in turn
implies that prices take longer to react to shocks, so a low α is the key property of the proﬁt
function that ensures substantial nominal rigidities.
5. AGGREGATION
5.1. Aggregation with identical ﬁrms
14In an economy with many inattentive producers, what can one say about the distribution
of their decisions dates? At ﬁrst, one might expect that this distribution depends so tightly
on the assumptions about the individual producers, that little can be concluded in general.
Surprisingly, it turns out that there are some general answers to this question.
Assume that there are many producers in the economy. The sequence of optimally chosen
planning dates for each producer D = {D(i)}∞
i=1 forms a sequence of stochastic increasing
events, while the inattentiveness intervals {d(i)}∞
i=1 are a sequence of non-negative random
variables. I assume that the costs of planning are positive almost surely, so the probability
that two or more decision dates occur simultaneously for a given producer is zero. I also
assume that planning dates are not always integral multiples of some non-negative number,
so D is not a lattice. While this case could be considered, I prefer to focus on the more
interesting case where inattentiveness varies randomly with changes in the proﬁts of ﬁrms
and the costs of planning.
The arrival of decision dates then takes the form of a stochastic point process. Its prop-
erties are described by a set of probability density functions for how long the inattentiveness
period will last, conditional on when the producer last adjusted. I denote these by fi(t) and
assume that:9
Assumption 2 The densities fi(t) describe random variables that are:
i) mutually independent;
ii) independent across producers;
iii) the same for all producers.
Independence of decisions dates is convenient since then I only need to keep track of when was
the last decision date for each producer. The assumption that all producers are independent
and alike in turn allows me to interpret fi(t) as the actual fraction of agents that are revising
their plan at a given instant in time. I will therefore refer to this as the distribution of
inattentiveness. In turn, the parameter ρ denotes the intensity of attention, deﬁned as the
long-run mean number of planning dates in a unit of time: ρ =1 /E[d(i)] as t →∞
While assumption 2 preserves great generality for the results that follow, it does restrict
the domain of the problem. For instance, (i) implies that no permanent shocks are allowed to
the producer’s computational ability. This excludes events such as the introduction of a new
accounting system in a ﬁrm that allows it to process information at a lower cost from then
onwards. The assumption that inattentiveness is independent across ﬁrms in turn precludes
aggregate shocks to information processing ability, such as for instance the introduction of
computers or the Internet. Finally, (iii) precludes the study of the case when some ﬁrms,
due to better organization, management, or economies of scale, may have lower information
processing costs. Note that (iii) is not a crucial assumption: I will relax it later in this
section. Parts (i) and (ii) of assumption 2 on the other hand are important for the results
that follow. One cannot get results without making some minimal assumptions and I leave
the task of relaxing these for future research.10
9The assumption is stated in terms of properties of the optimally chosen decision dates to make its
restrictions more transparent. But, it could also be stated in terms of properties of the state vector st,u s i n g
the results in section 4 to map these into properties of the decision dates.
10Note that assumption (ii) does not preclude the existence of aggregate shocks to the demand or technol-
15To focus on an economy that has settled at a steady state after operating for a long time,
Ii n t r o d u c et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Deﬁnition: The distribution of inattentiveness across ﬁrms is
(i) stationary,i ff o ra n yt>0 and any x ≥ 0, the probability of x decision dates in the
interval (a,a + t) is the same for all a ≥ 0;
(ii) an equilibrium,i fi ti st h el i m i to ft h es y s t e ma st −→ ∞.
I focus on studying the stationary equilibrium distribution of inattentiveness across ﬁrms.
Given this setup and without any further assumptions, the following remarkable result
holds:
Proposition 6. The only stationary equilibrium distribution of inattentiveness is the
exponential distribution with parameter ρ.
The process of arrival of decision dates is therefore a Poisson process with parameter ρ.T h a t
is, if at any point in time, we survey the producers on how long ago they last planned, we will
ﬁnd that the share not having planned for x periods equals ρe−ρx. Every instant, the share
of ﬁr m sp l a n n i n gi sc o n s t a n ta n de q u a lt oρ. This result is fortunate. The exponential dis-
tribution is easy to manipulate and its memoryless property allows for tractable aggregation
dynamics.
5.2. Heterogeneous ﬁrms
Now, I relax the requirement that producers are identical. I still require parts (i)-(ii) of
Assumption 2, and I further assume that the inattentiveness distribution of each producer
is stationary. In this case, I introduce two new assumptions: (1) that as J →∞ ,
PJ
j=1 ρ(j)
tends to a ﬁnite constant ρ; and (2) that after a decision date, the probability of there not
being a new decision date by the same producer at some point in the next ∆—length period,
should tend to unity equally for all producers as ∆ tends to zero. Both conditions are aimed
at diminishing the probability that one producer accumulates a large number of decision
dates in a short period of time and dominates the cross-sectional distribution. In this case:
Proposition 7. As J →∞ , the distribution of inattentiveness across ﬁrms tends to the
exponential distribution with parameter ρ.
The combination of Propositions 6 and 7 provides a strong case for using the Poisson
process to model the arrival of decision dates in the aggregate economy. Some intuition for
these results can be found in other common physical phenomena. Consider a large telephone
exchange which receives an incoming stream of pooled telephone calls from many diﬀerent
independent individuals. Or consider the places where ﬂying bombs from many diﬀerent
sources hit the south of London during World War II. Another example is the arrival of
goals at the many diﬀerent matches that compose the World cup soccer tournament. The
ogy, such as the productivity shocks in section 4.4 (or the nominal income shocks that will appear in section
6), as long as these shocks do not aﬀect the moments that determine inattentiveness. What it does preclude
are aggregate shocks that when realized aﬀect everyone’s decision of how long to be inattentive for.
16distribution of phone calls arrivals, the spatial distribution of bombs, and the distribution
of arrival of World Cup goals are all, essentially, analogous phenomena to the arrival of the
decision dates of agents in an inattentive economy.
These analogies are particularly interesting because while it is diﬃcult to measure the
inattentiveness of economic agents, these three physical phenomena are easily observed. A
well-known statistical regularity is that all of these physical phenomena empirically follow a
Poisson process. In turn, these observations motivated Khintchine (1960) to prove a theorem
that provides a precise mathematical justiﬁcation for these facts, of which Proposition 7 is an
application. Both mathematics and empirics therefore provide a strong case for exponentially
distributed inattentiveness.11
6. AN APPLICATION: A MODEL OF INFLATION
6.1. The model
Assume that there are many identical ﬁrms (a continuum) indexed by j.E a c h p r o -
duces a diﬀerentiated good facing a constant price elasticity demand function: Yt(j)=
Yt(Pt(j)/Pt)−θ. They all operate a linear production technology Yt(j)=AtLt(j), that uses
Lt(j) units of labor to produce Yt(j) units of output subject to exogenous stochastic labor
productivity At. T h e yh i r el a b o ri nt h em a r k e tp a y i n gar e a lw a g eWt(j)/Pt.T h e i n v e r s e
labor supply function is ω(log(Lt(j)),log(Yt)). It increases with the amount of labor sup-
plied, with an elasticity of ψ, and increases with aggregate income, with an elasticity of
σ, through a standard income eﬀect that makes agents prefer more leisure in good times.
Finally, assume that the costs of planning are a constant fraction κj of proﬁts at the time of
planning. To satisfy the conditions for the aggregation results in the previous section, the
costs of planning are stochastic and the expectation of √κj conditional on past information
is i.i.d. over time and across producers and
√
κ denotes its mean.
Finally, to close the model, I postulate an exogenous stochastic process for the log of
nominal income mt = pt + yt (small letters denote the log of a variable). This limits the
applicability of the model to study monetary or ﬁscal policy since it leaves aside the link
between direct policy instruments and nominal income. Likewise, the assumption of a labor
supply function ω(.) prevents the use of the model to study ﬂuctuations in consumption or
real wages. However, what these assumptions buy is an ability to study inﬂation and its links
to productivity and nominal income in a relatively general setting, since the assumptions
that I make are consistent with most existing models of inﬂation. Moreover, describing
the link between nominal income and inﬂation goes a long way towards understanding the
monetary transmission mechanism. While these assumptions narrow the applicability of the
model, and perhaps give it an unashamed partial equilibrium ﬂavor, they allow the model to
very generally answer questions about inﬂation dynamics in a tractable general equilibrium
setup.12
6.2. The type of plan and length of inattentiveness
11In state-contingent adjustment models, such a general and simple result does not seem to be possible.
12Reis (2003) studies the behavior of inattentive consumers so, in principle, one could build a model with
both inattentive consumers and producers. For now, I leave this for future work.
17The theoretical results proven so far can be applied to this problem. The ﬁrst result is
that since demand has a constant price elasticity and is subject to multiplicative shocks,
ﬁrms will set plans for their prices.
The optimal price charged at time t by a producer that last updated at time D is, up
to a ﬁrst order approximation, pt(j)=ED [pt + α(yt − yn
t )],w h e r eα is the index of real
rigidities that equals (σ +ψ)/(1 +θψ). The natural level of output, yn
t , is the output in the
economy if agents are attentive, which up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, moves in parallel
with productivity: yn
t − E[yt] = ((1 + ψ)/(σ + ψ))(at − E[at]).
The second main theoretical result concerned the optimal choice of the length of inatten-
tiveness. The proﬁt function is of the form π(pt(j) − pt,y t,a t) that section 4.4 studied, so







θ(θ − 1)(ψ +1 ) Va r[yt − yn
t ]
. (9)
To assess the predictions of the model for inattentiveness, I consider diﬀerent possible
parameter values for θ, σ and ψ. My preferred choices are: θ =1 0 , since it implies a markup
of about 11% consistent with the estimates in Basu and Fernald (1997); σ =1 ,s ot h a tr e a l
wages and real output grow at the same rate in the long run; and ψ =1 /0.15,t om a t c ht h e
estimates of the elasticity of labor supply surveyed in Pencavel (1986). Compared with other
research on inﬂation, these choices diﬀer from those of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)
only in ψ, which they set at 1.25. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) use aggregate data to
estimate θ =7 .88, σ =0 .16,a n dψ =0 .47. Finally, Ball and Romer (1990) set σ =0and
calibrate θ =7 .8 and ψ =6 .7.
I use log output per hour to measure yn
t since with the benchmark σ =1 ,u pt oac o n s t a n t
yn
t = at =l o g ( Yt/Lt).Im e a s u r eyt by quarterly real GNP and use an Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
to isolate the cycle in the output gap. The standard deviation of yt − yn
t in the U.S. data
from 1954 to 2003 is 0.014.
Finally, one must choose a value for the costs of planning as a share of proﬁts. Zbaracki
et al. (2004) followed a large U.S. manufacturing ﬁrm through its decision process, and
estimated how much it cost for this company to set a new price catalog. A conservative use
of their estimates that considers only the costs that are internal to the ﬁrm is 4.6% of the
company’s net margin. However, the accounting deﬁnition of the net margin may not be the
most adequate measure of proﬁts in this model. Using instead the Zbaracki et al. (2004)
estimates of the costs of planning as a share of total costs leads to an estimate of 2.8%.I
also consider lower costs of planning of 1% and 0.1%.
TABLE 2
Optimal expected length of inattentiveness in quarters
Parameter combinations (θ,σ,ψ)
Baseline Chari et al. Rotemberg-Woodford Ball-Romer
(10, 1, 6.7) (10, 1, 1.25) (7.88, 0.16, 0.47) (7.8, 0, 6.7)
Costs 0.046 10 13 26 12
of 0.028 8 10 20 9
planning 0.010 5 6 12 6
0.001 2 2 4 2
18Table 2 shows the predictions from equation (9) for the average length of inattentiveness
in quarters. A ﬁrst result to take away from the table is that very small costs of planning
can lead to considerable inattentiveness. Even when it costs only 0.1% of proﬁts to plan,
producers only plan about every 6 months. A second conclusion is that for the baseline
parameters and the Zbaracki et al. (2004) estimates of the costs of planning, we should
expect to see ﬁrms changing their plans about every 2 years. The model therefore predicts
inattentiveness of a plausible order of magnitude.
One can turn these predictions into a test of the model. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis
and Wolfers (2004) use data on inﬂation expectations to infer the speed at which information
disseminates in the economy. Both estimate an average inattentiveness of about one year. For
the four diﬀerent parameter combinations in the columns of Table 2, costs of planning of 0.7%,
0.4%, 0.1%, and 0.5% of proﬁts respectively, would generate this amount of inattentiveness.
These costs are consistent with Zbaracki et al. (2004), once you take into account plausible
measurement errors. The model is therefore consistent with the independent observations
on inattentiveness and on the costs of planning.
6.3. The Phillips curve
Up to a ﬁrst order log-linear approximation, the log price level equals the sum of the logs
of prices set by diﬀerent producers. If the index of the ﬁrms, j, stands for how long has it





where H(j) is the distribution of how long it has been since the last adjustment. The
third main theoretical result in this paper can now be used. It states that H(j) tends to






−ρ(t−j)Ej [pt + α(yt − y
n
t )]dj.
Taking time derivatives and rearranging, inﬂation is given by:13






−ρ(t−j)Ej [˙ pt + α(˙ yt − ˙ y
n
t )]dj.
This is a continuous-time version of the sticky information Phillips curve of Mankiw
and Reis (2002). As they showed, it has three desirable features that match the existing
evidence. First, disinﬂations always cause recessions (although announced disinﬂations lead
to smaller recessions than announced ones). Second, monetary policy shocks have their
maximum impact on inﬂation with a substantial delay. Third, the change in inﬂation is
positively correlated with the level of economic activity.14
13I use the standard notation ˙ xt t od e n o t et h et i m ed e r i v a t i v eo fag e n e r i cv a r i a b l ext.
14The Calvo (1983) sticky price model, per contra, can ﬁt none of these facts.
19Mankiw and Reis (2002) reached this Phillips curve by making three assumptions. First,
they assumed that producers are inattentive, only sporadically updating their information
sets. Second, they assumed that they set plans for prices. And third, they assumed that the
arrival of decision dates is a Poisson process. This paper instead only assumed that there
is a cost of acquiring, absorbing and processing information. It derived inattentiveness as
the optimal response to such costs. It showed the conditions under which producers choose
to set plans for prices. And it found that in a world with many agents, the distribution of
inattentiveness converges to that of a Poisson process. The inattentiveness model provides
a micro-foundation for the sticky information model.
Having this micro-foundation has many advantages. The model can be used to under-
stand other features of producer behavior aside from pricing, such as for instance the price
versus quantity decision. Moreover, the model provides a uniﬁed framework to study diﬀer-
ent types of behavior by diﬀerent agents. It can be applied to study the actions of consumers,
investors, or other economic agents. This is beneﬁc i a ln o tj u s tf r o mt h ep e r s p e c t i v eo fh a v i n g
a theory that is parsimonious and widely applicable, but also empirically, since the model
generates predictions across many dimensions that can be tested in diﬀerent ways. A further
advantage of having a micro-foundation is that it links the two key reduced form parameters,
α and ρ, to preference and technology parameters, which is helpful in assessing the likely
values of these parameters. Moreover, at least since Lucas (1976), economists have hoped
that these parameters are structural in the sense that they do not vary across diﬀerent policy
regimes, and so can be used to reliably forecast future inﬂation.
7. THREE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE MODEL
This section tests the model of inﬂation in three ways. First, I examine whether the
model is able to match the second moments characterizing the post-war U.S. inﬂation. While
Mankiw and Reis (2002) ﬁnd that the sticky-information model reproduces a few key qualita-
tive features of the data, the question I ask here is whether it can ﬁt the data quantitatively.
Second, I examine the usefulness of the micro-foundations at generating a model that can
forecast inﬂation out-of-sample, by comparing its performance with that of autoregressive
models.
The third test of the model is more demanding. I ask whether the model can also explain
the behavior of inﬂation during the pre-war United States. Because monetary policy was
very diﬀerent in this period, this amounts to asking whether the model survives the Lucas
(1976) critique.15
7.1. Can the model ﬁt the second moments of post-war inﬂation?
The two relevant reduced-form parameters of the model are α and ρ. Using my baseline
15These tests do not exhaust the set of empirical applications of the model. For instance, I do not estimate
the model. This would require overcoming some challenges with maximizing the likelihood function since
the model implies a recursive but inﬁnite moving average representation for inﬂation. Future research will
hopefully make progress on this problem.
20parameters for θ, σ and ψ, the implied value of α is 0.11.16 For ρ, I use the estimates of
Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and set ρ =0 .25 implying an average
inattentiveness of 1 year, which, following the discussion in section 6.2, is also consistent
with the other micro parameters.
To specify the stochastic processes for at and mt, I use quarterly U.S. from 1954:1 to
2003:4. Data for the log output per hour in the nonfarm business sector suggests that at
is a random walk, with a standard deviations of shocks of 0.008. Nominal GNP growth is
well described by an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter 0.39 and a standard deviation of
shocks of 0.009.
Table 3 uses these parameter values to display the model’s predictions for diﬀerent second
moments of inﬂation. It also shows the equivalent moments in the U.S. data. The model ﬁts
the data remarkably well. It closely ﬁt st h eu n i v a r i a t ep r o p e r t i e so fi n ﬂation, its variability
and its persistence. Moreover, it matches well the correlation of inﬂation with nominal
income and productivity, both contemporaneously and with 1-quarter leads and lags. With
only one exception, all of the model’s predictions do not diﬀer from the empirical moments
by more than 0.05.
TABLE 3










Note: The notation ∆xt denotes the quarterly change in variable xt.
The model’s predictions were obtained by simulating the model feeding
in the empirical innovations to nominal income and productivity. In the
data column are the sample moments in the period 1960:1-2003:4.
The exception is that the model predicts slightly more serial correlation for inﬂation than
what we ﬁnd in the data. However, if the measurement of inﬂation in the data is polluted
with some classical measurement error, we should expect the model to predict too much
persistence. If measurement error accounts for the tiny discrepancy between the standard
16The parameter α plays two crucial roles. First, a small α leads to long periods of inattentiveness and so
as m a l lρ (section 4.4). Second, keeping ρ ﬁxed, a smaller α generates larger real eﬀects of nominal shocks.
The reason is that, the smaller is α, the stronger are strategic complementarities in pricing, so the ﬁrms
that are adjusting wish to set their individual prices close to those set by non-adjusting ﬁrms. Through
these two roles, a small α leads to limited adjustment of prices and so large real eﬀects of nominal shocks.
Woodford (2003a: 163-173) discusses the calibration of α at length and, taking into account both micro
and aggregate evidence, he concludes that a value between 0.10 and 0.15 is adequate. Using the Chari et al
(2000) parameters, α =0 .17, the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimates, α =0 .13, and the Ball and
Romer (1990) parameters, α =0 .13.
21deviation of inﬂation in the model and the data (0.0003), then the model would predict that
observed inﬂation would have a serial correlation of 0.8869, very close to what we observe.
7.2. Can the model forecast inﬂation out-of-sample?
To forecast, aside from the structural parameters, the model requires as inputs the expec-
tations of future inﬂation and the growth rate of the output gap as of diﬀerent times in the
past. I obtain these from a bivariate VAR on these two variables and they enter the model
through the tightly speciﬁed term which weighs diﬀerent past expectations by the weights
of the exponential distribution.17
I evaluate the model’s performance at forecasting inﬂation one-quarter ahead relative to
two unrestricted reduced-form models. The ﬁrst is an unrestricted bivariate VAR of order 2
on inﬂation and the growth rate of the output gap. Unlike the tightly speciﬁc inattentiveness
model of inﬂation, this allows past information to be used freely in forecasting future inﬂation
The second model is an AR(2) of inﬂation. The order of both models minimizes the Bayesian
information criteria.
T h em o d e l sa r ee s t i m a t e du s i n gi n f o r m ation from the start of the sample, the ﬁrst quarter
of 1954, until a closing date. They are then asked to predict inﬂation one-quarter-ahead from
that closing date until the end of my sample at the last quarter of 2003. Table 4 compares
the mean squared forecast error of the inattentiveness model against the two reduced-form
models for two diﬀerent choices of the closing date: 1995Q4 and 1999Q4. In the ﬁrst case
the models must predict inﬂation for eight full years out-of-sample, and in the second for
four years.
The message of Table 4 is that the model clearly outperforms reduced-form models at
forecasting inﬂation. The improvement is 24% over the best reduced-form model in the




Forecasting period Inattentiveness VAR(2) AR(2)
2000Q1-2003Q4 0.0037 0.0051 0.0049
1996Q1-2003Q4 0.0031 0.0039 0.0037
Note: Each cell has the one-step ahead forecast MSE multiplied by 1000
7.3. Can the model ﬁt the facts on pre-war inﬂation?
Before World War I, monetary policy was very diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a ti ti sn o w :t h e r ew a sn o
Federal Reserve system and the gold standard dictated monetary policy. Correspondingly,
inﬂation was close to serially uncorrelated, in stark contrast with its high persistence in the
17I take this approach instead of using the simple exogenous processes for productivity and nominal income
in the previous section. With this alternative, it would be diﬃcult to distinguish which part of the model’s
good performance is driven by (only approximately true) assumptions on the exogenous processes, and which
part is due to the actual model of inattentiveness.
22post-war period. While the previous sections showed that the model can explain post-war
inﬂation, this section asks whether it can also explain the data from this very diﬀerent period.
The data for the pre-war period comes at an annual frequency from two sources. Kendrick
(1961) provides estimates of output per hour in the nonfarm sector from 1889 to 1913.18
Nominal income and its deﬂator from 1869 to 1913 come from Romer (1989).19 The stochastic
properties of these two series are markedly diﬀerent relative to the post-war period: both
nominal income growth and the level of productivity are approximately serially uncorrelated.
The model requires knowledge of the quarterly processes for mt and at however, and
many alternatives are consistent with these annual moments. I proceed by opting for the
most parsimonious quarterly statistical representations that are consistent with the annual
data. I choose a random walk for mt, since it implies that annual nominal income should be
an IMA(1,1) process with a moving average coeﬃcient of 0.24, a speciﬁcation that the data
does not statistically reject. For productivity, I use a quarterly white noise since it implies
a serially uncorrelated annual process.
As for the structural parameters, while the United States today is certainly very diﬀerent
from what it was at the beginning of the XXth century, there is no clear indication that the
elasticity of demand for products or the income and wage elasticities of labor supply were
much diﬀerent then from what they are now. I therefore assume that these micro parameters
have not changed and so α it still 0.11. By keeping this parameter ﬁxed, if I err, I will do
so against the model by forcing it to ﬁt two distinct periods with the same parameters. The
parameter ρ depends not only on these elasticities but also on the variance of the output gap
and on the costs of planning. Romer (1989) found that the standard deviation of detrended
output was 31% higher in the pre-war than in the post-war. In this more volatile pre-war
world, if the costs of planning were unchanged, producers would plan more often, about
once every three quarters. However, it is plausible that the great advances in information
technology during the XXth century have reduced the costs of planning. Producers would
wish to plan less often in the pre-war world, when planning was more costly. To give
some weight to this argument, in the baseline calibration of the model, I will consider two
possibilities for inattentiveness, 4 and 3 quarters.20
Table 5 contrasts the predictions from the model with the data for the 1890-1913 period.
It is noticeable from the second column how diﬀerent the sample moments are from the
post-war estimates in Table 3. It would be remarkable to have a model that could ﬁtb o t h
periods. The third column has the average predictions of the model and the fourth column
has 90% conﬁdence intervals. Table 5 shows that the performance of the model is not
quite as successful as in the post-war data. The model under-estimates the variability of
18In the beginning of the XXth century, agriculture had a large weight in the U.S. economy with man-
hours in the farm sector accounting for about 30% of total man-hours. Nevertheless, measuring at as output
per hour in the nonfarm sector or per hour in the whole economy is not important for my purposes: the
correlation coeﬃcient between the two series is 0.98.
19Balke and Gordon (1989) present a diﬀerent set of estimates of nominal GNP and its deﬂator. While
the two estimates of nominal income are quite similar, those of inﬂation have substantial diﬀerences. A
previous version of this paper contrasted the inattentiveness model with both sets of data, and found that
its performance was similar.
20A previous version of this paper also considered the case where the costs of planning would have risen
to make inattentiveness 3-year long. Details are available from the author.
23inﬂation, and also cannot match the contemporaneous correlations between nominal income,
productivity, and inﬂation. Nevertheless, over the other dimensions, the model does a good
job. It predicts about the right amount of persistence of inﬂation in the data and it captures
well the dynamic relation between inﬂation and lagged and lead nominal income and lagged
and lead productivity. The model can therefore match 5 of the 8 moments in the table.
TABLE 5
Model versus data in the pre-war United States
Data Model 90% conﬁdence interval Measurement Model with
error adjusted 3-quarter plans
St.Dev.(∆pt) 0.0280 0.0085 0.0063 ; 0.0111 0.0280 0.0113
Corr.(∆pt,∆pt−1) 0.1615 0.2242 -0.1985 ; 0.5904 0.0208 0.0527
Corr.(∆pt,∆mt) 0.7508 0.1184 -0.2020 ; 0.4154 0.0287 0.1742
Corr.(∆pt,∆mt−1) 0.2482 0.4044 0.0840 ; 0.6601 0.0980 0.4911
Corr.(∆pt,∆mt+1) 0.0187 -0.0758 -0.4056 ; 0.2605 -0.0184 -0.0570
Corr.(∆pt,∆at) -0.0916 -0.6510 -0.8349 ; -0.4347 -0.1577 -0.7189
Corr.(∆pt,∆at−1) 0.2212 0.3233 0.0746 ; 0.5585 0.0783 0.3547
Corr.(∆pt,∆at+1) 0.2571 0.3234 0.0729 ; 0.5604 0.0783 0.3557
Notes: The notation ∆xt denotes the annual change in xt. The data column has sample moments in
1890-1913. The predictions of the model come from drawing 10,000 innovations to nominal income and
productivity from normal distributions with variances set to equal the data, and reporting the average
and the 5% and 95% percentiles. The second to last column has the model’s predictions assuming that
classical measurement error accounts for the diﬀerence between actual and predicted inﬂation. The last
column has the model’s predictions if average inattentiveness is 3 quarters.
O n ep o s s i b l es o u r c eo fb i a si st h ee x t e n to fm e a s u r e m e n te r r o ri nt h ei n ﬂation data. The
ﬁfth column in Table 5 reports the predictions of the model assuming that there is classical
measurement error of inﬂation accounting for the discrepancy between the model’s predicted
standard deviation and the data. This modiﬁcation reconciles the predictions of the model
with the empirical contemporaneous correlation between inﬂation and productivity. Finally,
column six reports the predictions of the model when agents are inattentive for 3 quarters
on average. The model’s performance is similar to the one with 4-quarter plans.
T h er e s u l t si nT a b l e5a r et h e r e f o r em i x e d .T h em o d e lﬁts some dimensions of the pre-
war U.S. data, but misses other features of the data. Given the tall order put forward to the
model though, the results are encouraging. Few (if any) of the existing models of inﬂation
would perform this well across such diﬀerent periods in history.
8. CONCLUSION
I have presented a model in which producers face costs of acquiring, absorbing and
processing information. Producers optimally choose to be inattentive to current news, only
sporadically updating their information, expectations, and plans. I derived three main the-
oretical results. First, I established the conditions under which producers set plans for the
price to charge, rather than the quantity to sell. Second, I characterized the determinants
of the optimally chosen inattentiveness. Third, I showed that in a large population the
exponential distribution should approximate well the distribution of inattentiveness.
24This set of results should be useful in constructing models of inattentive economies to
study diﬀerent phenomena. In this paper, I applied the model to study inﬂation. I showed
that the inattentiveness model provides a micro-foundation to the sticky information Phillips
curve. I then tested this micro-founded model of inﬂation dynamics on three aspects of the
data and found that the model performed well. First, the model could replicate very closely
the second moments in the post-war data. Second, it beat reduced-form autoregressive model
in out-of-sample forecasting. And third, it fared moderately well at ﬁtting the pre-war facts
on inﬂation, a very demanding test of its invariance across policy regimes.
The inattentiveness model follows in the tradition of the menu cost models introduced
by Mankiw (1985). The research that followed his work, however, interpreted menu costs
as physical ﬁxed costs of changing prices, leading to an emphasis on sticky price models.
The inattentiveness model instead stresses an interpretation of menu costs as ﬁxed costs of
acquiring information, and especially of absorbing and processing it. Plans and information
are then sticky, rather than prices. This change in interpretation may seem slight, but it
turns out to imply a very diﬀerent model and implications for inﬂation dynamics.
The inattentiveness model in this paper is certainly not the only economic model to treat
information as a costly good, and the treatment in this paper is admittedly coarse. For
instance, the model side-steps some interesting questions that arise when producers look
to each other to infer information. (Caballero, 1992, takes a ﬁr s tp a s sa tt h i sp r o b l e m . )
Likewise, while the inattentiveness model emphasizes people’s limited ability to absorb and
process information, many interesting behavioral questions remain on how to model the
details of these limitations. These are fascinating research areas for future work to explore.
Still, for now, this paper has provided the foundations to build models of nominal rigidity
based on limited information that provide a counterpart to the micro-founded sticky-price
model of Sheshinski and Weiss (1978, 1982), Caballero and Engel (1991) and Caplin and
Leahy (1997). Moreover, the tools and lessons in these paper, combined with those in Reis
(2003), who studies inattentive consumption choices, suggest that enough progress has been
made that it is within our grasp to construct fully-ﬂedged, micro-founded, general equilibrium
models of interacting inattentive agents. This is not an easy task, and there remain several
diﬃcult (but interesting) obstacles to overcome. Given the success that models based on
inattentiveness have in describing the data, this seems to be a worthy pursuit.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Since Π(s,t) and K(s) are well-deﬁned and continuous and D satisﬁes
the measurability restrictions, then J(s,D) is well-deﬁned. From assumption 1, 0 ≤ Π(s,t) < +∞
for all s and t. The costs of planning are also non-negative and ﬁnite. Therefore J(s,D) is bounded
below and above. The constraint set for D including the measurability restrictions and the law
of motion for the state is clearly non-empty. Bellman’s principle of optimality (Stokey and Lucas,
1989) then shows that V (s)=m a x D J(s,D).S i n c eJ(s,D) is well-deﬁned and bounded above, so
is V (s). The fact that V (s) exists, is unique, and continuous follow from the continuity of Π(s,t)
and K(s), and the fact that V (s) is the ﬁxed point of a contraction mapping of continuous into
continuous functions (Stokey and Lucas, 1989). k
25P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . With full information on the state of the demand shocks s,l e tt h e
optimal choices of price and quantity be denoted by the functions P(s) and Y (s). These are the
solutions from maximizing either πP(P,s) with respect to P,o rπY (Y,s) with respect to Y .W i t h
full information, they are of course equivalent: Y (s)=Q(P(s),s).
With inattentiveness, deﬁne the proﬁt functions: πP(Pt,st) ≡ PtQ(Pt,st)−C(Q(Pt,st),st) and
πY (Yt,st) ≡ Q−1(Yt,st)Yt −C(Yt,st). Then, the optimal price charged in a price plan is P∗,w h i c h
solves maxPt E[πP(Pt,st)] a n ds oi si m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁn e db yt h eﬁrst order-condition: E(πP
p (P∗,s)) =
0.Aﬁrst order Taylor approximation of this equation around E(s) shows that: P∗ = P(E [s]) +
O(kˆ sk
2). I denote s − E[s] by ˆ s. This is the well-known certainty equivalence result that, up to
a ﬁrst order approximation, optimal choices are equal to the choices with full information if the
random variables equal their expected values. By a similar argument, the optimal quantity sold
with a quantity-plan is ˆ Y = Y (E [s]) + O(kˆ sk
2).
Then, note that
πP(P∗,E(s)) = πP(P(E [s]) + O(kˆ sk
2 ,E[s])
= πP(P(E [s]),E[s]) + πP
p (P(E [s]),E[s])O(kˆ sk
2)+O(kˆ sk
3)
= πP(P(E [s]),E[s]) + O(kˆ sk
3),
showing that when s equals its expected value, proﬁts under a price plan diﬀer from proﬁts with
full information by at most a third-order term. The second line follows from a Taylor approxi-
mation, and the third line from the ﬁrst order condition. Similar steps show that πY (ˆ Y,E[s]) =
πY (Y (E [s]),E[s]) + O(kˆ sk
3),s oπP(P∗,E[s]) − πY (Y (E [s]),E[s]) is at most third order.
A second-order approximation of the diﬀerence between proﬁts with price or quantity plans
around E [s] gives:
















All the functions on the right hand side are evaluated at (P∗,E[s])o r(ˆ Y,E[s]). Consider each
of the terms in turn. The previous paragraph showed that πP − πY is or order O(kˆ sk
3).T h e
second term disappears after taking expectations. As for the third term, using the deﬁnitions of
the proﬁt functions, πP
ss = P∗Qss −CqqQ2
s −CqQss −2CqsQs−Css and πY
ss = Q−1
ss Q−Css,s os i n c e






ss Q − CqqQ2
s − CqQss − 2CqsQs
¢
(s − E [s])2.
Finally, use the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximization with respect to prices, Q + PQp =
CqQp,t or e p l a c ef o rP. Since price plans are preferred to quantity plans if ΠP(s,t) ≥ ΠY (s,t),













































Rearranging gives the condition in proposition 3. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Re-write the costs of planning as K(st)=κ2 ˜ K(st),w h e r eκ is a non-
negative scalar. I will approximate the solution around κ =0 .21 First, subtract the discounted
proﬁts obtained from setting prices or quantities with current information on st.U s i n g V (.) to
denote the value function for this problem (a slight abuse of notation):








−κ2 ˜ K(Ψ(s,ud)) + V (Ψ(s,ud))
i¾
(11)
























Vκ(s)=e−rdE[−2κ ˜ K(sd)+Vκ(sd)]. (14)
The last condition is the envelope theorem condition with respect to κ.
The system of equations (11)-(14) deﬁnes the optimum. When κ =0 , the solution to the system
is d∗ =0and V (s)=0 . At this optimum, G(s,0) = 0 for all s and Gj(s,0) = 0 as well. Similarly,
the nth-order derivatives of V with respect to s are all zero. Perturbing the system (11)-(14) by
diﬀerentiating with respect to κ and evaluating at κ =0(where d∗ =0 , V =0 , Vs =0 ):
Vκ = Vκ


















All the functions are evaluated at s and t =0 .T h eﬁrst and third equations contain no information
but the second and fourth form a system of equations that I can use to, substituting for the term










˜ K, the expression for d∗ follows. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5. The optimal price can be found by maximizing expected proﬁts. Using
21The reader is invited to check that perturbing with respect to κ2 leads to a bifurcation.
The method of undetermined gauges could be used to show that κ is the leading term in the
approximation.












where the second equality follows from the fact that E(sd)=s for a geometric Brownian motion.
The problem in (4) is in this case:









d + V (sd)
i¾
.
Given the iso-elastic form of the return function, the value function is iso-elastic as well. Let
V = As1−θ,w h e r eA is a coeﬃcient to be determined. The Bellman equation then becomes:











Cancelling terms and since E(s1−θ
d )=s
1−θ
ebd,w h e r eb =0 .5θ(θ−1)σ2 as st is a geometric Brownian
motion:





+ e(b−r)d (−κΞ + A)
¾
. (15)





Ξ +( b − r)ebd (−κΞ + A)
i
=0






1 − e(b−r)d∗¢ .
Using this in the ﬁrst order condition and rearranging then yields the condition:
Γ(b,κ,d∗) ≡ re−bd∗
− be−rd∗
+( b − r)(1− κr)=0
Substituting for b and multiplying by 2 gives the result in the proposition.
Next, I check the second-order conditions for the maximization problem in (15). Note that:
∂2A
∂d2 = −re −rd
h




+e−rdb(b − r)ebd (−κΞ + A).
At the optimal d∗,t h eﬁrst order condition implies that the ﬁrst term in the sum is zero, and that
the second term equals −Ξbe−rd. Therefore:
∂2A
∂d2 = −Ξbe−rd < 0,
28which guarantees that the zero of the function Γ(b,κ,d) corresponds to a maximum.
The optimal choice of inattentiveness d∗ is the zero of Γ(.). Consider then two cases: (i) b>r ,
and (ii) r>b . I nc a s e( i ) ,i ti se a s yt os h o wt h a tf o rκ>0,t h e nΓ(b,κ,0) < 0, Γd(.) > 0,a n d
limd→∞ Γ(.)=( b−r)(1−κr). It follows that if κ<1/r there is a unique optimal ﬁnite d; otherwise
d∗ =+ ∞.F o rd∗ > 0, the implicit function theorem implies that sign{∂d∗/∂κ} = sign{−Γκ(.)}
which is positive so d∗ increases with κ. Similarly, it takes a little work to show that Γb(b,κ,d∗) > 0,
which implies that d∗ decreases with b, and therefore with σ2 and θ. Turn now to case (ii). Now
Γ(b,κ,0) > 0 and Γd(.) < 0 but still, if κ<1/r, then limd→∞ Γ(.) < 0,s ot h e r ei sau n i q u eﬁnite
d∗. It is easy to show that now Γκ(.) > 0 while it takes some work to show that Γb(b,κ,d∗) < 0,
from where the same comparative statics follow.
Finally, to obtain the approximation, you can use the result in proposition 4, but the condition
Γ(b,κ,d∗)=0allows for a check on this result. Let ˜ κ =
√
κ, and note that Γ(b,0,0) = 0,t h a t
Γd(b,0,0) = 0 and that Γ˜ κ(b,0,0) = 0. The implicit function theorem, Γdd˜ κ + Γk =0then does
not apply since Γd =0and Γ˜ κ =0so the point ˜ κ = d =0is a bifurcation point. One further round
of diﬀerentiation plus the fact that Γd˜ κ(b,0,0) = 0 lead to the conclusion that d˜ κ =
p
−Γ˜ κ˜ κ/Γdd.
Al i t t l em o r ea l g e b r as h o w st h a tΓ˜ κ˜ κ(b,0,0) = −2r(b − r) and Γdd(b,0,0) = br(b − r).S i n c e a
ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of d∗ around ˜ κ =0is given by d∗ = d˜ κ
√
κ,t h er e s u l ti nt h e
proposition follows. k
Proof of equation (8): If the agent is inattentive, she will set the same price that all other
inattentive agents set. Then p(j)=p,w h i c hs o l v e sE[πp(0,y,a)] = 0. If she is attentive, she sets
price p(j)∗ that solves: πp(p(j)∗ − p,y,a)=0 . A second-order approximation around the point
(0,E[y],E[a]) of the diﬀerence between proﬁts if attentive or inattentive is:
π(p(j)∗ − p,y,a) − π(0,y,a)=




πpp(p(j)∗ − p)2 + πyy(y − E[y])2 + πaa(a − E[a])2¤
+πpy(p(j)∗ − p)(y − E[y]) + πpa(p(j)∗ − p)(a − E[a]) + πya(y − E[y])(a − E[a])




πyy(y − E[y])2 + πaa(a − E[a])2¤
− πya(y − E[y])(a − E[a])





πpp(p(j)∗ − p)2 +2 πpy(p(j)∗ − p)(y − E[y]) + 2πpa(p(j)∗ − p)(a − E[a])
¤
The natural level of output is deﬁned by πp(0,yn,a)=0 : it is the output that prevails if
all are attentive. A log-linear approximation shows that πpy(yn − E[y]) = −πpa(a − E[a]).A
log-linear approximation to the ﬁrst-order condition for p(j)∗ gives p(j)∗ − p = α(y − yn),w h e r e
α = −πpy/πpp.
Using these results to substitute for (a − E[a])and for p(j)∗ − p in the expression above gives:
π(p(j)∗ − p,y,a) − π(0,y,a)=−
πppα2(y − yn)2
2





Since Va r[y−yn]=E[(y−yn)2]−(E[y] − E[yn])
2, and since the equation deﬁning the natural level
of output implies that E[y] − E[yn] is second order, it follows that E[(yt − yn
t )2]=Va r[yt − yn
t ].
Finally, Gt(s,0) is the instantaneous variance of the output gap. k
Aggregation: The arrival of decision dates is a point process of the type that is studied in
renewal theory. Cox (1962) and Khintchine (1960) are classic references, while Ross (1983) has a
more recent treatment. The proofs that follow combine results from this literature. Throughout, I
use the notation:
Φi(t) - the cumulative density function associated with fi(t),
Hi(t) - the probability that have not planned since date D(i − 1), i.e., Hi(t)=1− Φi(t),
Ai(t) - the age of a plan, i.e., Ai(t)=t − D(i − 1) for D(i − 1) ≤ t<D (i),
Vi(t) - the remaining duration of the plan, i.e., Vi(t)=D(i) − t for D(i − 1) ≤ t<D (i),
Ii(t) - the number of plans made by date t,i . e . ,I(t)={i : D(i) ≤ t<D (i +1 ) },
M(t) - the mean number of planning dates until t,i . e . ,M(t)=E [I(t)].
Proof of Proposition 6. This proof proceeds over a sequence of steps.
Step 1: Reducing the problem to only two distributions.
The ﬁrst step is to reduce the problem of characterizing the inﬁnite set of distributions Φi(t),t o
that of characterizing only two distributions. The intuition behind this result is that if the economy
has converged to a stationary equilibrium distribution and one observes it at a particular instant
in time, there are only two distributions characterizing inattentiveness from then on: one for the
length until the immediate next planning date, and the other being the stationary distribution. The
proof proceeds as follows: deﬁne the probability h(τ,t) for two consecutive periods of length τ and
t respectively, as the probability that (a) there was at least one decision date in τ, (2) there were
0 decision dates in period t. The probability of (b) conditional on (a) is h(τ,t)/Φ(τ).A sτ → 0,
this is Palm’s function ϕ(t)=l i m τ→0 h(τ,t)/Φ(τ), which gives the conditional probability that no
decision dates occur in period t,i ft h eﬁrst instant of this period was a decision date. Khintchine
(1960: 45-48) proves the following result:
Theorem: Φi(t)=1− ϕ(t) for all i ≥ 2.
I therefore only need to describe two distributions, Φ1(t),a n dΦ(t)=Φi(t) for all i ≥ 2.
Step 2: Proving the Elementary Renewal Theorem: ρ =l i m t→∞ M(t)/t.
This is one of the most fundamental results in renewal theory. One of many possible versions of a








= E[I +1 ] E[d(i)].T a k i n g
















Next, ﬁx a constant X and deﬁne an alternative decision process by
¯ d(i)=
½
d(i), if d(i) ≤ X
X, if d(i) >X
for i =1 ,2,...This in turn deﬁnes ¯ D(i)=
Pi
j=1 ¯ d(j), ¯ I(t)=s u p
©
i : ¯ D(i) ≤ t
ª
and ¯ M(t)=E[¯ I(t)].
Since the inattentiveness lengths are bounded above by X:
¯ D(I(t)+1 )<t+ X.










Finally, note that ¯ D(i) ≤ D(i) necessarily, and so ¯ I(t) ≥ I(t). It then must be that ¯ M(t) ≥ M(t).
Letting X →∞ ,s ot h a tE
£¯ d(i)
¤






















→∞ ,t h e nρ → 0.
Step 3: Finding the distribution f1(t).
Ia mn o wr e a d yt oﬁnd the ﬁrst of the two distributions. From the deﬁnition of Vt, the time until
the next planning date is:
Prob(Vτ = t)=f1(τ + t)+
Z τ
0
f(t + u)dM(τ − u).
This is because for the time to the next planning date to be in (t,t + ∆t), either the ﬁrst decision
date took place in this interval, or the last decision date occurred at some other date u.T a k et h e
limit of this expression as τ →∞ ,h a v i n gt h eﬁrst term go to zero (which I will verify later). Then,





f(t + u)du = ρ(1 − Φ(t)).









in many cases under only the elementary renewal theorem, but in general it may require a closely
related alternative called the key renewal theorem (Ross, 1983: 61-65).
Then, recall that since I am focussing on an equilibrium, time 0 corresponds to an observation
of a world that has been operating since −∞.T h e r e f o r e
f1(t)= l i m
τ→∞Prob(Vτ = t)=ρ(1 − Φ(t))
Step 4: Proving that M(t)=ρt.
Combining steps 2 and 3, one can then characterize the mean number of planning dates in equilib-







i(Prob[D(i) ≤ t] − Prob[D(i +1 )≤ t])






























where the ﬁrst and third equalities are standard results for Laplace transforms, and the second
equality follows from the result in step 3. Substituting for L(Φ1(s)) in the expression for L(M(s)):
L(M(s)) = ρ/s.
Inverting the Laplace transform, it follows that M(t)=ρt.
Step 5: Proving that the distribution is exponential.
Starting from this previous result, it only takes a few calculations to show that if the mean number
32of planning dates until t rises linearly with t, then the distribution of these planning dates must be
exponential. This follows form collecting the results in steps 3 and 4 since:
Prob(Vτ = t)=f1(τ + t)+
Z τ
0
f(u + t)dM(τ − u)




= ρ(1 − Φ(t)),
which holds exactly for all t. But then, since at a planning date VD(i) and D(i) coincide:
f(t)=ρ(1 − Φ(t)).
This forms a diﬀerential equation, with solution:
f(t)=ρe−ρt.
The distribution of inattentiveness is exponential. k
Proof of Proposition 7. This is the Palm-Khintchine theorem, applied to the setup in this paper.
See Khintchine (1960) for the proof. k
Proof of equation (9). The proﬁt function in this model is:
π(pt(j) − pt,y t,a t)=eyt+(1−θ)(pt(j)−pt) − eyt−θ(pt(j)−pt)−aω(yt − θ(pt(j) − pt) − at,y t).
In the proof of equation (8), I showed that yn −E[y]=−
πpa
πpy(a−E[a]). Using a ﬁrst-order approx-
imation to logω(.,.) and evaluating the derivatives of the proﬁt function shows that −πpa/πpy =
(1 + ψ)/(σ + ψ). Similarly, evaluating −πpy/πpp gives the expression for α in the text. To get d∗,
just compute πpp/π and use the expression for α. k
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